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Abstract
This paper estimates a dynamic oligopoly model to assess the economic consequences
of a horizontal merger that took place in 1970 to create the second largest global pro-
ducer of steel. The paper solves a Markov perfect Nash equilibrium for the model and
simulates the welfare e⁄ects of the horizontal merger. Estimates reveal that the merger
enhanced the production e¢ ciency of the merging party by a magnitude of 4.1 %, while
the exercise of market power was restrained primarily by the presence of fringe com-
petitors. Our simulation result also indicates that structural remedies endorsed by the
competition authority failed to promote competition.
Keywords: Horizontal merger; Dynamic oligopoly; E¢ ciency; Markov perfect equilibrium;
Merger remedies
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1 Introduction
The economic approach to the evaluation of horizontal mergers stresses the trade-o⁄between market
power and e¢ ciency gain. Mergers, which reduce the number of competitors, raise the possibility
of strengthening market power and thus aggravating any deadweight loss. Conversely, mergers
integrate productive facilities and introduce new production processes, leading to possible gains
in e¢ ciency. While the extant merger literature has devoted considerable attention to measuring
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1the anticompetitive e⁄ect of horizontal mergers, remarkably little research has been conducted
to examine their e¢ ciency e⁄ect. Given the substantial increase in the number of mergers and
acquisitions over recent years, evidence on the e¢ ciency e⁄ects of horizontal mergers can provide
important guidance for antitrust authorities, who decide whether a particular merger should be
allowed, prohibited, or cleared subject to certain remedies. Since the e¢ ciency e⁄ects of horizontal
mergers are not always immediately apparent, empirical research that measures such e⁄ects requires
a dynamic model that accounts for ￿rms￿intertemporal decision making.
This paper quantitatively assesses the welfare trade-o⁄ associated with a horizontal merger in
an attempt to redress the lack of evidence of e¢ ciency gain. For this purpose, the paper uses a
unique case of a horizontal merger that occurred in the Japanese steel industry. In 1970, Japan
celebrated the birth of Nippon Steel, the world￿ s second largest steelmaker. The new Japanese
company came into being through the merger of Yawata and Fuji, the two largest Japanese steel
producers at the time. The merger was approved by the Japan Fair Trade Commission (J-FTC)
under the condition that the merged parties would transfer a fraction of their productive capacities
to their competitors.
A notable aspect of the Japanese steel industry in the postwar period was its active investment
in new plants and equipment. Indeed, during the study period, the steel industry accounted for
more than 15% of the manufacturing sector￿ s capital investment expenditure. Buoyed by boom-
ing demand in the 1960s, the steel industry vigorously introduced a number of new steel-making
furnaces that utilized advanced cost-reducing technologies. As production capacity expanded, the
annual output of crude steel ￿ which began at ￿ve hundred thousand tons in 1950 ￿ doubled every
￿ve years; this elevated Japan to the status of the world￿ s largest steel exporter by 1969. This pa-
per quanti￿es the extent to which investment on capital a⁄ected steel production and explicitly
accounts for the dynamics resulting from ￿rms￿capital investment behavior.
Although there does not appear to exist any opportunity to conduct controlled experiments on
the 1970 merger, we can still perform counterfactual exercises by following two steps. The ￿rst
is to use observed data along with an economic model to recover the estimated parameters of the
underlying economic primitives that were invariant in the horizontal merger. We then construct a
theoretical model of the steel industry, where oligopolists make optimal decisions regarding produc-
tion and investment on the basis of their competitors￿strategies. The second step involves using
the model to simulate changes in equilibrium outcomes on the basis of the counterfactual situation
in which Yawata and Fuji do not engage in the merger. We also consider another counterfactual
situation in which the merger took place in the absence of the merger remedies. For the simulation
approach to be successful, the model used for the exercise must closely approximate the economic
environment under study. We follow the research of Ericson and Pakes (1995) and use the method
2of Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) to compute a Markov-perfect equilibrium of the dynamic
game in order to account for the ￿rms￿capital investment processes.
The estimation results show that the merger under study substantially enhanced production
e¢ ciency and far exceeded the welfare loss associated with an increase in market power. The paper
￿nds that the merger reduced the marginal cost of production for the merging party by a magnitude
of 4.1 %. Conversely, despite the fact that the combined market share of Yawata and Fuji was nearly
￿fty percent of the market under our study, the merger raised steel prices by a mere one-￿fth of one
percent. The post-merger price would not have much increased because steel demand is estimated
to be price elastic. Indeed, the post-merger price may well have been constrained by the presence
of electric arc furnaces, which was an alternative source of steel supplied by emerging minimills.
As a result, the merger may have improved the social surplus (i.e., the sum of the consumer and
producer surpluses) by approximately 45 %, as compared with a situation in which no merger had
taken place.
It is interesting to note that the merger enhanced production e¢ ciency not only for the merging
party, but also for the non-merging parties. Our estimates of the equilibrium policy function imply
that after the merger, ￿rm investment activities turned into strategic substitutes, which is in
stark contrast to the pre-merger period in which the activities were complemented strategically.
This change in strategic relationships in terms of ￿rm investment activities corroborates with the
developments reported in trade journals. Hence, while Nippon Steel exercised restraint with respect
to capital investment, the non-merging companies increased their investment amounts in response
to the merger, thereby improving their productive e¢ ciency.
The paper also assesses the e⁄ectiveness of the merger remedies accepted in the negotiation
process between the J-FTC and the companies involved in the merger. Competition authorities
are entitled to accept remedies from merging parties on the condition that the remedies are pro-
portionate to anticompetitive concerns. Without such remedies, merger decisions would be binary
(either prohibited or cleared). Remedies are therefore supposed to constitute an additional tool for
competition authorities to resolve the competition problems generated by a merger while preserv-
ing the prospective e¢ ciencies. Accordingly, the 1970 merger was approved under the condition
that the merging party would transfer a total of 1.8 % of its capital equipment to two smaller
￿rms, namely, Nihon Kokan and Kobe. Our ex-post simulation results show that, although this
condition helped the two ￿rms remain viable competitors in the market, the divestiture failed to
achieve the full e¢ ciencies that should have been realized from the merger. That is, our estimate
indicates that the merging party would have made better use of the transferred capital than did
either Nihon Kokan or Kobe. As a result, the proposed divestiture exacerbated social welfare by
JPY 21 billion (USD 700 million) annually during the study period. While this welfare calculation
3uses ex-post information, it is also instructive to consider the proposed merger remedies from the
ex-ante perspective by use of the pre-merger information available up to 1969. A casual exami-
nation of the estimates of both the investment policy and marginal cost functions shows that the
J-FTC￿ s decision to accept the proposed merger remedies might not have been reasonable. On the
basis of the information publicly available at the time of the J-FTC￿ s merger decision, the paper
￿nds that the allocation of capital from the merged party to the two smaller companies would have
made little economic sense at the time, since the proposed divestiture would have been expected
to neither increase capital investment nor enhance productive e¢ ciency at the industry level.
This paper￿ s contributions to the empirical literature on horizontal mergers are twofold. First,
this study is the ￿rst to assess the productive e¢ ciency accrued by a particular merger case by
explicitly taking into account the dynamic nature of investment choice. Over the past decade, a large
body of literature has devoted considerable attention to predicting the price e⁄ect of hypothetical or
actual horizontal mergers in various industries (e.g., Dube, 2004; Peters, 2006). However, as noted
by Whinston (2006; 127), remarkably few research works have examined the e⁄ects of horizontal
mergers on productive e¢ ciency.1 One work that explicitly quanti￿es such e⁄ects is Pesendorfer￿ s
(2003) research on the U.S. paper and pulp market. He employs a static model to examine the
e⁄ects of capacity investment on a mergers outcome, and the model assumes that the mergers have
no e⁄ect on the ￿rm￿ s investment behavior. This paper extends his model to a dynamic context and
allows for strategic interaction in ￿rm investment behavior. The paper ￿nds that the nature of the
￿rm￿ s investment behavior was considerably altered at the time of the merger, and that neglecting
this feature would overstate the e¢ ciency e⁄ect of the merger in our application of the Japanese
steel industry. 2
Second, this paper contributes to a small but important body of literature involving empirical
assessments of the e⁄ectiveness of merger remedies. To our knowledge, only one study on this topic,
conducted by Davies and Lyons (2008), empirically uses a static framework to assess the design
of merger remedies employed in the European Union (EU) paper and pharmaceutical industries.
Compared with their work, this paper focuses solely on divestiture and allows a ￿rm￿ s dynamic
investment decision-making processes to quantify the e⁄ectiveness of the merger remedies. While
divestiture commitments tend to be preferred by competition authorities (FTC, 1999), this paper
￿nds that the proposed remedies under study did not appeared to improve welfare from either
1Many merger studies using dynamic models are based on numerical calibration, and not on an empirical method.
Previous work on numerical analyses includes Compte, Jenny, and Rey (2002) and Chen (2008).
2In a section of their analysis, Hashmi and Biesebroeck (2007) also examine the e⁄ect of mergers in a global auto
market by using a dynamic model. However, their research interest lies in the changes in the number of patents
owned by ￿rms; this di⁄ers considerably from our focus on the steel industry, where several patents were ￿led during
the study period.
4ex-post or ex-ante perspective.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the Japanese
steel industry in the postwar period, particularly the merger between Yawata and Fuji in 1970.
This section also evaluates the merger from a static perspective, following the approach proposed
by Farrell and Shapiro (1990). The analysis ￿nds that an examination of the traditional criteria with
the Her￿ndahl-Hirschman index (HHI) would likely result in a recommendation that the merger
be challenged. On the other hand, the static equilibrium analysis indicates that the merger would
improve social welfare if it was pro￿table for the merging ￿rms. Section 3 presents a dynamic
model that explicitly accounts for the dynamics arising from investment behavior, which was one
of the most important features of the Japanese steel industry in the 1960s and 1970s. Section 4
discusses the estimation results. The results lead to three important ￿ndings; (1) steel demand
was elastic with respect to price; (2) the marginal cost of production exhibited economies of scale
in terms of both capacity size and the cost synergies associated with the merger; and (3) the
merger changed the nature of strategic interaction in investment behavior among ￿rms from one
of strategic complement to one of strategic substitute. Using these results, Section 5 performs
policy experiments to evaluate the welfare consequences of the horizontal steel merger and assess
the e⁄ectiveness of divestiture as a merger remedy. Section 6 concludes and is followed by Data
Appendix.
2 Historical Background and Preliminary Analysis
This section begins with a historical overview of the Japanese steel market, with particular emphasis
on the study period 1960￿ 1979. Section 2.1 illustrates that each ￿rm￿ s active investment was an
important characteristic of the Japanese steel industry. The features of the market described in
this section lead us to develop a dynamic structural model, which is discussed in Section 3. Before
introducing such dynamic decision making, Section 2.2 uses the static analytical framework of
Farrell and Shapiro (1990) to assess the welfare impact of the merger that took place between
Yawata and Fuji in 1970. This static analysis is inadequate for the study of the steel merger,
because it neglects the dynamic features of the ￿rms￿investment decision making; however, it
provides a useful starting point from which to consider the e⁄ect of the 1970 merger. The static
analysis in this section concludes that the steel merger improves social welfare so long as the merger
is privately pro￿table.
52.1 Overview of the Industry
Yawata and Fuji were originally under the same ownership: this was dissolved in 1950 by the
occupation forces, who were attempting to create a competitive environment for the Japanese steel
industry. At the same time, the occupation forces established the J-FTC along with antitrust
monopoly law. However, despite their e⁄orts, only a handful of dominant major ￿rms operated
during the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, over 80 % of the Japanese steel production was accounted for
by integrated steel manufacturers. These manufacturers transformed raw materials (iron ore and
coking coal) into pig iron in a blast furnace. Pig iron was then transformed in a re￿ning furnace
into crude steel, the homogeneous product on which we focus in this study.3 The following seven
integrated companies enjoyed the largest shares in the market: Nippon Steel, Yawata, Fuji, Nihon
Kokan, Kawasaki, Sumitomo, and Kobe (in order of average market share). Note that Nippon
Steel was created in 1970 by the merger between Yawata and Fuji. Since then, Nippon Steel has
remained the second largest steel producer in the world ￿ after U.S. Steel at the time of the merger
and now after Arcelor Mittal. This paper focuses on the abovementioned seven Japanese integrated
companies and characterizes the structure of the market. In the 1960s and 1970s, no entries and
exits took place, except for those associated with the Yawata-Fuji merger. Therefore, during the
study period, the Japanese steel market was of little relevance to the merger waves observed in
other markets, including the U.S. paper and pulp industry studied by Pensendorfer (2003).
Beginning in the 1960s, integrated steel makers faced increasing competitive pressure from a new
type of steel producer, namely minimills. In contrast to the integrated steel makers, minimills own
no blast furnace but instead electric arc furnaces to use steel scrap and electricity as major inputs
to produce crude steel. In the 1960s, minimills appeared to catch up with integrated steel makers in
terms of production capacity size and crude steel quality, as electric arc furnaces began producing
on an increasingly larger scale with supplies of high voltage electricity. Thus, the emergence of the
alternative source of steel supplied by minimills should have increased the elasticity of steel demand
faced by the integrated steel manufacturers.
Table 1 presents important statistics, classi￿ed according to the pre- and post-merger periods.
The average price of crude steel increased by approximately 50 %. This price increase may not
have been entirely due to the merger; recall that major oil crises occurred in 1973 and 1979. In
Sections 4 and 5, we identify the extent to which the merger accounted for the price hike shown in
the table.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Japanese steel industry was characterized by ￿rms￿active invest-
ments in new plants and equipment. This feature is demonstrated by the index of the capital-labor
3While we could alternatively focus on processed crude steel ￿ namely, ordinary steel including bars, rails, and
wires ￿ ￿rm output data are not available at this category level.
6ratio, which is de￿ned as the ratio of the value of tangible ￿xed assets to the number of employees.
The index indicates that the capital intensity of the steel industry was three times higher than
the average of the manufacturing sector and twice that of the chemical industry. In fact, Figure
1 shows that the production capacities of both blast and re￿ning furnaces expanded at the rate
of approximately 20 % during the study period. Note that the new production facilities utilized
the latest technology, which further pushed ￿rms￿production frontiers and thus reduced the cost
of steel making. Therefore, the active investment observed in the steel industry re￿ ects the ￿rms￿
incentives for e¢ cient steel production in a market where only a handful of ￿rms dominated. It
is also worth noting that non-merging ￿rms invested more in the post-merger period than in the
pre-merger period: Table 1 shows that the average investment share of a non-merging ￿rm became
larger in the 1970s (13.70!17.37), whereas that of a merging party became smaller (45.21!30.52).
In Section 3, we introduce the dynamic decision-making model to associate this ￿nding with strate-
gic interaction in investment behavior.
The rapid production growth indicated in Table 1 was accompanied by export expansion, and
Japan￿ s share of the world export market grew from less than 5% in 1955 to 9% in 1965. Most
of Japan￿ s steel had been shipped to Asian countries until the early 1960s, when an increasing
proportion began to be exported to North America. Nevertheless, the steel export market was
fairly competitive from 1955 to 1980, and there is little evidence that Japanese steelmakers had
market power during that period. The Japan Iron and Steel Exporters￿Association (1974) observed
that the Japanese Freight on Board (FOB) steel price was not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from the price
in Antwerp, Belgium, which was known as the center of the world steel trade at that time. It is
thus reasonable to assume that the exported steel was competitively supplied in the world market.4
Japan had an import tari⁄ of 15% on steel until 1967 when it agreed to reduce the rate by half
at the Kennedy Round of General Agreement of Tari⁄s and Trades (GATT). However, while the
import tari⁄ protected domestic steel makers from direct competition with foreign steel makers, it
may have had little to do with the increase in Japanese steel production shown in Table 1, because
Japan also exported steel during that period. Indeed, the share of steel imports accounted, on
average, for a mere 0.2 % even after the tari⁄ was reduced. We therefore assume that steel imports
were not substituted by steel produced by Japanese companies and did not a⁄ect the domestic
Japanese market.
4This assumption is also consistent with the evidence presented in Ohashi (2005), which indicates that the export
subsidy on Japanese steel was not based on pro￿t shifting.
72.2 Static Analysis of the Merger
In evaluating a proposed merger, antitrust o¢ cials in the U.S. generally apply the rules summarized
in the Department of Justice￿ s Merger Guidelines (1992). Traditional merger analysis under the
guidelines involves estimating the e⁄ect of a proposed merger on market concentration. Roughly
speaking, the guidelines permit mergers that will result in either a low initial level of concentration
in the industry or small predicted changes in concentration. In the guidelines, concentration is
measured according to the HHI, which is de￿ned as the sum of the squares of the ￿rms￿market
shares. In retrospect, the initial level of and change in HHI due to the merger between Yawata
and Fuji exceeded 1800 and 100, respectively, as shown in Table 2. Thus, unless further analysis
indicates that entry would be easy or that important e¢ ciencies would be created, the Merger
Guidelines would most likely recommend that the merger be challenged.
Careful assessment of horizontal mergers requires in-depth analysis of how they will a⁄ect equi-
librium output and welfare; however, this analysis was lacking in the abovementioned traditional
approach using the concentration index. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) provide such an analysis in the
context of Cournot competition in a homogeneous product market. One principle issue investigated
by Farrell and Shapiro (1990) involved the identi￿cation of a su¢ cient condition for a merger to
increase aggregate surplus provided that the proposed merger is pro￿table for the merging parties.5
Suppose that ￿rms in set I contemplate merging. Let qi denote ￿rm i￿ s output and Q, the industry
output. Under the presumption that the proposed merger is pro￿table for the merging ￿rms, a










where si is ￿rm i￿ s premerger market share, sI is the collective market share of the ￿rms in set
I, and
dqi
dQ is the di⁄erential change in non-merging ￿rm i￿ s output when the industry output
changes marginally. Eq. (1) establishes that the merger is welfare enhancing without the need
to quantify the e¢ ciencies created by the merger. That is, the condition is purely a function
of premerger market shares and the non-merging ￿rms￿reactions to the merging ￿rms￿output
reductions. According to Eq. (1), the proposed merger improves the aggregate welfare when the
non-merging ￿rms are large and increase their outputs upon the merger. Indeed, this is the case
for the Yawata-Fuji merger: using the observed outcomes following the actual merger, which are
shown in Table 1, we ￿nd that Eq. (1) holds, as sI = 45, and the RHS is equal to 120.
Although Farrell and Shapiro (1990) provide a useful preliminary assessment of the particular
merger, the approach relies on a static framework that does not ￿t well with the industry under
5Another principle issue examined in Farrell and Shapiro (1990) involved the identi￿cation of the condition in
which the proposed merger reduces the price.
8study. One of the notable aspects of the steel industry in the postwar era was that the world
steel market featured active investment on new plants and equipment. Further, the investment
was propelled not only by surges of steel demand, especially in Europe and Northeast Asia, but
also by advances in new technology, including the introduction of the basic oxygen furnace and
large-scale blast furnaces. Indeed, the steel industry accounted for more than 15% of the capital
investment expenditure in the Japanese manufacturing sector. Since investment is a main strategic
choice variable in the steel industry, careful analysis of the steel merger between Yawata and Fuji
requires a more complete model that accounts for a dynamic environment in which ￿rms make
intertemporal decisions on investment, such as the one we present in the next section.
3 A Dynamic Model of the Japanese Steel Industry
This section describes a model used to explain the Japanese steel market in the period from 1960
to 1979. We begin the section by providing an overview of the estimation model. In Section 3.1,
we present the timing of the game used in the paper￿ s analysis and introduce state variables and
their transition equations. We then discuss the details of the model in the remaining section.
3.1 Overview of the Model
Our empirical goal is to evaluate the welfare e⁄ects of the 1970 merger between Yawata and Fuji by
explicitly accounting for the dynamics resulting from investment behavior. The merger may have
lessened competition in the steel market and simultaneously yielded e¢ ciency gains in production.
To assess this tradeo⁄, which was originally identi￿ed by Williamson (1968), it is necessary to
construct a theoretical model that captures the salient features of the Japanese steel industry in
the postwar era.
As described in Section 2, the Japanese steel market is characterized by active investment in
capital; moreover, only a handful of dominant major ￿rms operated in the market under minimal
international competitive pressure. Capital investment improves production e¢ ciency in future
periods, whereas an oligopolistic market structure generates concerns for strategic behavior. Since
these market features contain important implications for our assessment of the 1970 merger, we
build a dynamic model of ￿rm behavior that allows for strategic interactions between ￿rms. We
extend the model of dynamic competition proposed by Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007; hereafter
BBL) to incorporate ￿rms￿intertemporal decision making about capital accumulation. The model
used here represents a special BBL case in that we do not consider the issue of ￿rms￿entries and
exits; no such events were observed in the data except for the 1970 merger under question.
There are Nt ￿rms at time t, denoted by i = 1;:::;Nt. In our application, Nt takes the value 6
9prior to 1970 and the value 5 after the merger. Our data set, which comprises annual data, covers
the period from 1960 to 1979, indexed by t. The industry state at each period t is summarized by
a vector of the commonly observed variables, st. This state vector includes the amount of gross
national expenditure (in 1960 prices), zt, and a vector of capital stock kt whose i-th component is
￿rm i￿ s capital stock ki;t.6 The variable zt is used as a demand shifter, as discussed in Section 3.2.
At the beginning of period t, and given the state st, each ￿rm makes its decision on the
amount of investment, denoted by Ii;t. In the model, investment serves to enhance the e¢ ciency of
steel production through capital accumulation. No divestment was observed in the data primarily
because of the high economic growth that occurred during the study period; thus, we do not consider
the possibility of divestment in the paper. Each ￿rm subsequently receives its private productivity
shock ￿i;t and the industry-wide demand shock ￿t and engages in competition in the crude steel
market. The crude steel product is considered to be homogeneous, and ￿rms simultaneously choose
their quantities for each period t. Let qi;t denote ￿rm i￿ s quantity of crude steel chosen in period
t, and Qt denote the industry output, which is de￿ned as the sum of qi;t over i. We assume that
the shocks ￿i;t and ￿t are drawn independently from each other across the periods. These shocks
are considered to in￿ uence the current payo⁄ and output quantities but have no e⁄ect on the
future sequences of either shocks or outputs. Therefore, the equilibrium quantities are obtained
using a static decision-making problem. We assumed that ￿i;t and ￿t are independent over time;
this is because the number of state variables would increase if otherwise, since ￿rms would then
presumably consider other ￿rms￿private states on the basis of their past actions.
Finally, we assume that an adjustment in capacity takes one year to implement. This assumption
approximates the case of the steel industry, which experienced a time delay in the installation of
production facilities, such as furnaces. More precisely, the transition of the capital stock is described
as ki;t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)ki;t+Ii;t, where the capital depreciation rate is common across ￿rms and denoted
by the exogenous parameter of ￿ 2 [0;1]. Following the method of Ogawa and Kitasaka (1998), who
calculate the capital depreciation rates of various manufacturing sectors, we set ￿ at 0.0805. Another
state variable, zt, is assumed to follow the path observed in the data. We denote p(st+1jIt;st) as
the probability density that st+1 is reached when the current state and action are given respectively
by It and st, where It is the investment vector whose i-th component is Ii;t.
As discussed in Section 2, since no ￿rms entered or exited the market during the study period,
our model assumes that the number of active ￿rms is exogenously given by Nt. Note that the
timing of the game described above implies that each ￿rm makes its production and investment
decisions without knowing the decisions of their competing ￿rms.7 In Section 3.2, we describe the
6The gross national expenditure highly correlates with the transportation production index, the shipbuilding
production index and the gross domestic capital formation in both the public and private sectors.
7In the preliminary analysis, we modi￿ed the timing of the game and estimated the model under the assumption
10model of output choice and de￿ne the ￿rms￿per-period payo⁄s.
3.2 Output Choice
We begin with the model of steel production technology. Availability of ￿rm-level factor input
data is limited; therefore, we build a cost function that describes the steel making process. We
assume that an increase in the ￿rm￿ s capital reduces the marginal cost of production. This is a
reasonable assumption because the ￿rm￿ s capital investments mostly take the form of augmenting
new steel making furnaces, which utilize the latest cost-reducing technologies. Thus, it is likely
that an increase in ki;t will improve productive e¢ ciency. Since the ￿rm￿ s investment is capitalized
at the end of the period, we model ￿rm i￿ s marginal cost at time t, mci;t, as the following form of
the constant returns to scale with an additive error term ￿i;t:
mci;t = ft (ki;t;￿c) + ￿i;t; (2)
where ￿c is the set of cost parameters to be estimated. Since we have no prior knowledge
regarding the functional relationship between mci;t and ki;t, we use a polynomial-series estimator
of ft (￿), as detailed in Section 4. The sign in the derivatives of ft (￿) with respect to ki;t is an
empirical question of interest. To anticipate the result reported in the next section, we ￿nd the
￿rst derivative to be signi￿cantly negative: this is consistent with the hypothesis that an increase in
the ￿rm￿ s capital reduces the marginal cost of steel production. Eq.(2) assumes no spillovers in that
the bene￿ts of making investments are fully appropriated within the ￿rm. The characteristics of
steel production mentioned above suggest that ￿rm i￿ s cost-reducing technology is not transferable
to other ￿rms because the technology is physically utilized in furnaces owned by the ￿rm itself.
Other than the capital stock, important in￿ uences on the marginal cost include labor skills,
research and development (R&D) activities, and utilization. Since no data that accurately re￿ ect
these in￿ uences are available, such supply shocks are captured by the term, ￿i;t.8 We allow this term
to have ￿rm- and time-speci￿c components, denoted by ￿i and $t, respectively, in the estimation.
Thus, ￿i;t ￿ ’i;t + ui;t, where ’i;t ￿ ￿i + $t. The error term ui;t is the error drawn independently





, where the variance parameter ￿u is to be
estimated. In the estimation section, we relax the distributional assumption on ui;t to examine the
robustness of the cost estimates. The ￿xed-e⁄ect treatment deals with any industry-wide supply
shock as well as with the e¢ ciency di⁄erences among ￿rms that do not change over time.
that the investment decision is made after ￿rms observe ￿i;t and ￿t. The results are available upon request. The
main results have no signi￿cant e⁄ect on those reported in this paper.
8Hashmi and Biesebroeck (2007) uses data on patents to represent R&D activities. Japanese steel ￿rms, however,
￿led few patents associated with their production technologies. Thus, it is di¢ cult for us to quantify R&D activities
by use of the method employed in Hashmi and Biesebroeck (2007).
11Since it is di¢ cult to ￿nd accurate cost data to directly analyze Eq.(2), we estimate the price-cost
margins by building a competition model and thereby obtain the cost parameters. In particular,
we construct a steel maker￿ s pro￿t maximization problem and solve the ￿rst-order condition. We
establish the following supply-side model. Suppose that ￿rm i competes and chooses its output at




, in which ￿d is a set of demand parameters to be estimated. The other
variables have been de￿ned in the previous subsection. In this paper, we treat the amount of export
as exogenously given because exported steel is reasonably assumed to be competitively supplied in
the world market, as discussed in Section 2. We assume that zt is observed by the econometrician,
while ￿t is unobserved. Nevertheless, since both the demand shifters are observed by ￿rms, we
correct for this potential endogeneity in Section 4. Moreover, the demand error, ￿t, is assumed to






parameter ￿￿ is to be estimated.
In each period, after the choice of investment, ￿rm i observes the shocks ￿t and ￿i;t, and










Under the assumption made in Section 3.1, steel output and price are determined in the static
equilibrium conditional on the current state. Hence, the maximized pro￿t for ￿rm i is a function








condition derived from ￿rm i￿ s static pro￿t maximization under Cournot competition takes the










where "t is the elasticity of demand with respect to price. We do not consider the possibility of
capacity constraint in Eq.(4) because it is known to be di¢ cult to de￿ne the maximum available
production capacity in this industry. Note that the unit of measurement di⁄ers between qi;t and
ki;t; the former is in terms of physical tonnage, while the latter is in terms of monetary value (at
1960 prices). Since a small-sized furnace with advanced technology was often more expensive than
a conventional large-scale furnace, it is nearly impossible to determine the link between the two
variables in order to infer the utilization rate in this industry.
Using the demand estimates obtained in Section 4 and the data, we can derive mci;t from the
￿rst-order condition in Eq. (4). In the next subsection, we construct the discounted future payo⁄s
and introduce a set of parameters associated with ￿rm investment decisions.
123.3 Investment Choice
In this subsection, we describe the model of investment choice, or the decision that is made prior
to the output choice. At the beginning of period t, and given the state st, each ￿rm makes its
decision on the investment amount prior to the realization of ￿t and ￿i;t. The investment decision
is inherently dynamic because according to Eq.(2), a ￿rm receives bene￿t from the investment in
the future periods. In the investment choice, ￿rm i is assumed to maximize the following expected















where the expectation is taken over other ￿rms￿investment choices in the current and future periods
as well as over the current and future values of all the state variables and private shocks. Each ￿rm
discounts its future pro￿ts according to a common discount factor ￿ with a common information
set. In the estimation, we set the discount factor equal to 0.85. Recall that we do not consider the
issue of ￿rm entry and exit in this study.






i;t fIi;t > 0g (6)
where the curly bracket f￿g is the indicator variable, which takes the value of 1 when the statement
inside the bracket is true, and 0 if otherwise. Note that ￿ is the set of parameters ￿r that are to be
estimated. We employ a polynomial expansion with respect to Ii;t to characterize the investment
cost ￿(￿).
Following Maskin and Tirole (1994; 2001), we consider a pure Markov perfect Nash equilibrium
(hereafter MPNE). We restrict our attention to pure strategies and do not consider mixed strate-
gies. The MPNE in this paper consists of a set of best-response strategies that govern investment
decisions. An equilibrium is assumed to exist, the theorem of which is examined by Doraszelski
and Satterthwaite (2003) in dynamic oligopoly models. In our modeling assumption, a Markov
strategy for ￿rm i describes the ￿rm￿ s behavior at time t as a function of the commonly observed
state variables at time t. The Markovian assumption allows us to abstract from calendar time. We
thus omit the time subscript hereafter, provided the omission does not cause confusion.
The value function Vi is the discounted sum of pro￿ts at the beginning of a period before the
shocks are realized. It can be decomposed down into two components: the per-period payo⁄ and
the continuation value. Each ￿rm uses the value function to determine its investment amount in the
intertemporal optimization condition, where today￿ s incremental cost incurred by making a unit of
13investment equals the present value of the bene￿t of cost reduction through capital accumulation.
Let I (s) be a set of investment strategies for all ￿rms, whose i-th component is ￿rm i￿ s investment
strategy Ii (s). Note that the value function integrates out all the private and industry shocks in
the per-period payo⁄ function. Thus, ￿rms base their investment strategy on the current state
variables. Under the MPNE, we can rewrite the value function in Eq. (5) in the following recursive
form:
Vi (s;I) = E(￿;￿)
￿













where the expectation operator E(￿;￿) [￿] is taken over ￿ and ￿, conditional on s. Note that the
i-th component of ￿ is ￿i, de￿ned previously in this section. The pro￿le I (s) is a Markov perfect




and e I di⁄ers from I only at the i-th element. We describe how
to obtain an alternative policy e I in the next subsection.
In the context of dynamic investment estimation, previous studies describe a policy function
to illustrate that a ￿rm￿ s strategic investment behavior is responsive to its own state and rival
￿rms￿states. For example, Hashmi and Biesebroeck (2007) postulate that an R&D investment
policy function can be described as a function of other ￿rms￿combined knowledge and the ￿rm￿ s
own knowledge stock. In a study of the U.S. cement industry, Ryan (2006) also modeled a ￿rm￿ s
physical investment in capacity adjustment as a function of the ￿rm￿ s own capacity and the sum of
its competitors￿capacities, in addition to the market productivity shock. We follow the treatment
of the existing literature and assume that the investment policy is a function of the state variables

















which the variance parameter ￿2
"I is to be estimated. We use a polynomial expansion to approximate
the policy function g (￿) as detailed in Section 4. If strategic considerations were not important in
the ￿rm￿ s investment decision, we would expect the second term in g (￿) to have no explanatory
power.
3.4 Estimation Procedure
In this subsection, we describe the procedure for estimating the parameters of the dynamic invest-
ment model presented above. We adopt a two-step method proposed by BBL (2007), who use a
simulation-based method to recover a ￿rm￿ s value function from the observed data. Their approach
involves two stages. In the ￿rst stage, the ￿rm investment policy function is recovered by regressing
14observed actions on the observed state variables. The product market pro￿t function, along with
the probability distributions of the three shocks ￿, ui, and "I
i are also estimated at this stage. In
the second stage, the dynamic parameters governing the cost of investment is estimated, such that
the observed functions obtained in the ￿rst stage become optimal. The estimates are then used to
simulate the model in order to assess the e⁄ect of the merger between Yawata and Fuji, which is
discussed in Section 5.
The ￿rst stage involves the estimation of both the per-period pro￿t function obtained from the
product market and the investment policy function. The per-period pro￿t function, which com-
prises demand and cost functions, is estimated outside the framework of the dynamic optimization
problem. We ￿rst estimate three types of demand for steel of homogeneous quality in a static con-
text. The use of market-level data in the study period from 1960 to 1979 uncovers demand elasticity
with respect to price, j"tj. We address the endogeneity of price by using cost-side instruments. The
demand estimates are used to obtain the marginal cost under the assumption that ￿rms compete
over quantities in the product market.
The policy function illustrates the investment action taken by a ￿rm for any particular state
vector. The theoretical model introduced previously in this section suggests that the policy function
should be a function of the state variables. Thus, under the assumption that ￿rms play an MPNE, a
￿ exible estimation method should trace the true underlying investment policy function in response
to the state vectors. Finally, we estimate the variance parameters in the probability distributions
of ￿, ui, and "I
i by using the residuals obtained above.
The second stage of the estimation procedure is concerned with recovering the set of investment-
cost parameters, ￿, which causes the policy function obtained in the ￿rst stage to become optimal.
To do so, we evaluate a ￿rm￿ s value function by using the forward simulation procedure laid out
by BBL (2007), which is as follows. Given the initial state s1960 and arbitrary values for the set
of dynamic parameters ￿0, we draw the shocks ￿, ui, and "I
i independently and randomly from the
corresponding normal distributions. Notice that the variances of these normal distributions are
already estimated in the ￿rst stage and that we use the actual value for z, a subset of the state
variables. On the basis of the realized shocks, we calculate the amount of investment using Eq.(8)
and derive demand and marginal cost functions to compute equilibrium outputs and per-period
pro￿ts for the year of 1960 using Eq(3). We subsequently use the capital accumulation process to
determine the next period￿ s state, s1961. Following the same procedure, we compute the per-period




￿ ￿(I1961;￿0), where b ￿ is a set of demand and cost
parameters estimated in the ￿rst stage. We continue this process until the end of the study period
(1979) and obtain the following present discounted pro￿t for ￿rm i:















where the expectation operator is taken over the future states. We run this forward simulation 1000
times and take the average to obtain a numerical estimate of Vi (s1960j￿0). Under the MPNE, the
model stipulated here should hold at any arbitrary value on the initial state variables. We can thus
construct an alternative equilibrium path as follows: we ￿rst randomly draw ￿rm j from [1;:::;Nt],
and then the value as from a uniform distribution [￿0:1;0:1]. We subsequently construct the initial
state variables by replacing sj;1960 by (1 + as)sj;1960 and apply the forward simulation in the same
manner applied for the case of s1960. In the end, we derive 300 equilibrium paths for Eq.(9).
Finally, we employ a minimum distance estimator to estimate ￿ on the basis of the concept of
MPNE. For the investment policy function I (s) to be an MPNE strategy, the following inequality




, where e I di⁄ers from I only at
the i-th element, under the condition that the true dynamic parameter is ￿. Using the same draws




for an alternative policy pro￿le of e I. We obtain this
alternative policy pro￿le by randomly drawing the value aI from a uniform distribution in the
range from [￿0:1;0:1] for each period, and replacing Ii with (1 + aI)Ii. We then construct the
following minimum distance estimator:










. The idea is that the estimator is calculated by




is greater than that of Vi (s;I (s)j￿). As long as
I (s) is an MPNE strategy, this strategy should maximize ￿rm i￿ s present discounted pro￿t. Notice
that we simulate the evolution of the state vector for the period from 1960 to 1979, and do not
extend the simulation beyond this period. This is primarily because, as Figure 1 illustrates, the
steel industry appeared to enter a new phase of its evolution; ￿rm investment activities slowed
down as the market became satiated. We now report the estimation results in the next section.
4 Empirical Results
This section applies the estimation models described in the previous section to the annual frequency
data set for the period from 1960 to 1979. We chose to start the sample in 1960, when Kobe ￿ the
smallest company in the data set ￿ had a fully operational blast furnace and became an integrated
steel maker. Including Kobe in this study helps us expand the data set.
16We ￿rst discuss the estimation of the demand and marginal cost functions as well as the policy
function. We then proceed to the estimation of the dynamic parameters associated with the invest-
ment cost. The summary statistics pertaining to the important variables used in the estimation
appear in Table 1, and the data sources are presented in the Data Appendix. Section 5 uses the
estimates reported in this section to assess the economic consequences of the 1970 merger.
Demand Estimates We follow the literature regarding the homogeneous product demand model




typically involves a functional-form assumption. The shape of the demand function determines
the demand elasticity with respect to price and, thus, in￿ uences the marginal cost estimate. For
example, under our assumption of Cournot competition with a constant marginal cost, a linear-
demand speci￿cation imposes the LHS of Eq.(4) proportional to ￿rm i￿ s output quantity, while a
log-linear speci￿cation restricts the LHS proportional to ￿rm i￿ s market share. We are therefore
interested in comparing the implied marginal cost estimates from a variety of commonly used
functional forms. Following Genesove and Mullin (1998), we estimate three di⁄erent inverse demand
functions of the linear, quadratic, and log-linear forms:
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B belongs to ￿d, in which A = fL;LL;Qg and B = f0;1;2;3g, and ￿A
t is the demand
error for each speci￿cation. Two variables are used as exogenous demand shifters: zt and the year
dummy variables, which take a value of one for the years in the period after the ￿rst oil crisis of
1973, and zero for the remaining years. The second demand shifter is included in order to capture
the extent to which the demand structure was altered in the post oil crisis period. The potential
endogenous variables in (11) are pt and Qt. To correct for this possible endogeneity problem, we
employ the two-stage least squared (2SLS) estimation. Regarding instruments, we use the prices
of the major factor inputs used in steel making, namely, iron ore and heavy oil (both in terms of
logarithms). We also use the average seaborne shipping distance of iron ore. Note that all iron
ore was imported from neighboring countries such as the Philippines and later India because of the
demand for better quality. The data consist of the annual time series in the study period from 1960
to 1979.
Table 3 presents two broad columns of demand estimates. The ￿rst column is based on the
ordinary least squared (OLS) method, and the second is based on the 2SLS method. Each column
contains the three demand speci￿cations presented in Eq.(11). The upper portion of Table 3 reports
the estimates of the regression coe¢ cients. Our inferences are based on heteroskedasticity-robust
17standard errors. All the results obtained indicate that the models ￿t the data well; the measure of
the adjusted R2 is above 0.9.
It is known that the 2SLS method can produce severely biased estimates if the instruments
are weak. We thus check the explanatory power of the instruments, conditional on the included
exogenous variables in the ￿rst stage of the 2SLS method. We obtain an F-statistic for each of
the endogenous variables discussed above. Table 3 reports the average value of the F-statistics.
We ￿nd that all the instruments used in this paper are not weak at the 99 % con￿dence level.
The estimated coe¢ cients in the table are obtained by regressing the dependent variable on the
exogenous and ￿tted values of the endogenous variables.
All the speci￿cations reported in Table 3 yield precise estimates of the demand shifters. The
implied demand elasticity with respect to price is calculated for each speci￿cation on the basis of
the obtained demand estimates. The elasticity is fairly elastic: its values range from 2.96 to 3.95.
Comparison between the demand elasticities obtained from the OLS and 2SLS methods indicates
the successful elimination of endogeneity from the positive correlation between steel output and
demand shock: the mean value of the implied demand elasticity obtained from the 2SLS estimates
is approximately 20% lower than those obtained from the OLS estimates. In the remainder of this
paper, we use the log-linear form as the base speci￿cation of steel demand, because it achieves
the highest log-likelihood concentrated with respect to a variance parameter. The other demand
estimates make no qualitative change to the main empirical results discussed in the subsequent
sections. Under the log-linear form, we estimate ￿￿ as 0.05, the value of which is used for the
forward simulation.
Marginal cost Estimates Using the demand estimates obtained in Table 2 and the ￿rst-order
condition in Eq. (4), we calculate the marginal cost of steel production and estimate Eq. (2). Since
we have no prior knowledge regarding the functional relationship between ki;t and the calculated
mci;t , we use a polynomial expansion to approximate ft (￿). The empirical results presented here
use a third order polynomial to approximate ft (￿), but there is almost no change in the minimand
when we go from a third to a fourth order approximation.
Four estimation results are presented in Table 4. While with the ￿rst two speci￿cations, we
assume that the marginal cost error, ui;t, follows i.i.d and apply the OLS estimation method to
the data, the remaining speci￿cations allow for other types of error structures and use the feasible
generalized least squared (FGLS) method. Speci￿cation (4-A) includes the ￿rm- and year-speci￿c
components, vi and $t, already introduced in Section 3.2. While (4-B) substitutes a random e⁄ect
for vi, we ￿nd that the Hausman-Wu test rejects this speci￿cation at the 99% con￿dence level.
The paper thus focuses on the ￿xed-e⁄ect speci￿cations. Speci￿cations (4-C) and (4-D) allow
for ￿rst-order autocorrelation, namely AR(1), in ui;t, and (4-D) further incorporates additional
18heteroskedasticity in the error. Notice that the number of observations is smaller for (4-C) and
(4-D) because we drop a year from the data for each ￿rm to estimate the AR(1) coe¢ cient. The
table shows that the autocorrelation coe¢ cient, which is common across all the ￿rms, is estimated
to be signi￿cant at the value of 0.51, and the Breusch-Pagan test did not reject the presence of
heteroskedasticity. Nevertheless, all speci￿cations yield precise estimates regarding the relationship
between mci;t and ki;t. The estimates indicate that the averaged values in the elasticity of marginal
cost with respect to its own capital are of similar magnitudes across the speci￿cations in the
range from -0.014 to -0.025. The estimates of ￿rm-speci￿c components indicate that the merger
substantially improves production e¢ ciency for the merging party. In comparison with the average
estimates of the ￿rm-speci￿c e⁄ects in Yawata and Fuji, the table indicates that the merger enhanced
the e¢ ciency of Nippon Steel in the range of JPY 1329 to 2155 per ton of steel. To take the
most conservative estimate of the e¢ ciency gain from the merger, we employ (4-A) as the base
speci￿cation for the paper￿ s analysis.9 Using (4-A), we estimate ￿u as 275 and use this value for
the forward simulation, as discussed later in this section.
Estimates of Policy Function and Investment Cost The next task is to characterize the
policy function, which describes the equilibrium behavior of ￿rms conditional on the state vector. To
uncover the manner in which ￿rms reacted to changes in the economic environment, we empirically
estimate the policy function, I (s), as being as ￿ exible as possible from the observed investment
decisions. Owing to the limited data set, we approximate the policy function by using a polynomial
series estimator, g (￿), in Eq.(8). The results presented here use up to a third-order polynomial-
series estimator, but the results are qualitatively the same as those obtained by a fourth-order
polynomial. The estimator includes the gross national expenditure, ￿rm i￿ s own capital, the sum
of the capital owned by the other ￿rms, and their full interaction terms.
The results are summarized in Figure 2. The estimated investment policy function appeared to
have experienced considerable changes in 1970 when the merger took place. In order to conserve
space, we present two panels from the respective years 1969 and 1971. The results for the other
years in the study period are available in the unpublished appendix. Each panel in Figure 2
illustrates, conditional on zt, a three dimensional relationship among Ii;t, ki;t, and
P
j6=i kj;t in the
region where the data are observed in each year. To more closely examine the estimated policy
function, we illustrate cross-sectional views in Figure 3. The upper portion of Figure 3 shows the
9Though not reported in the table, we also estimated the model that allows for the AR(1) coe¢ cient to di⁄er
by ￿rm. The averaged value of the autocorrelation coe¢ cients is 0.502, and the rest of the estimates are of similar
magnitude. Note that using the estimates from (4-C) and (4-D) imposes additional di¢ culty in the estimation of our
dynamic model because each ￿rm may infer private information about the other ￿rms by observing past values of
the marginal cost error.
19relationship between Ii;t and ki;t for the years 1969 and 1971, while the lower portion presents the
relationship between Ii;t and
P
j6=i kj;t for the same years.
Figures 2 and 3 indicate that the 1970 merger resulted in substantial changes in the ￿rms￿invest-
ment behavior. Two observations are worth noting with respect to the estimated policy function.
First, throughout the study period, the amount of capital investment by each ￿rm increases with
its own capital stock, except for Nippon Steel, which exhibited a negative relationship. Second, for
all the steel makers under consideration, the correlation between investment and the sum of other
companies￿capital stocks was found to be positive prior to the merger but negative afterwards.
The ￿rst observation comes from the estimation results, which show that investment activity
reinforces itself. As indicated in the upper left panel in Figure 3, a ￿rm of larger scale (in terms of
capital stock) invests more, leading to divergence in capital size across ￿rms. This multiplier e⁄ect,
however, appeared to diminish as the ￿rm size became adequately large. Indeed, the upper-right
panel of Figure 3 implies that the capacity size begins to stabilize for Nippon Steel.
The second observation o⁄ers an interesting insight regarding strategic interaction in the ￿rms￿
investment decisions. The lower two panels in Figure 3 illustrate that ￿rm investment activities
were a strategic complement before the merger but became a strategic substitute afterwards. The
nature of the strategic interaction observed in the estimated policy function appears to be consistent
with the information obtained from trade journals.10 It is known that under the booming steel
demand, integrated steel makers engaged in ￿erce competition in terms of capacity expansion in the
late 1950s and the 1960s. Indeed, the Ministry of Industry and International Trade (MITI), backed
by several steel makers, made several attempts to cartelize the steel makers and coordinate their
investment activities. Though all these attempts failed because small companies did not follow
suit, competition in investment was never an issue in the industry circle after Yawata and Fuji
consolidated their investments. While weaker competition in capital investment may have been
due to the fact that steel demand began to be satiated (see Figure 1), this observation appears
to agree with our ￿nding that the ￿rms￿investment activities became strategic substitutes in the
post-merger period.
The estimates for the dynamic parameters of investment cost are presented in Table 5. We
estimate them through the minimum distance estimator in Eq. (10). This estimation procedure was
also described in the previous section. Since we have no prior information regarding the investment
cost function, we again employ a polynomial series expansion to estimate ￿ in Eq.(6). Table 5 shows
a ￿rst-order, second-order, and third-order polynomial series with respect to the ￿rm￿ s investment
amount. Since we formulate the investment cost as a linear function of its amount, the minimum
distance estimator is formulated as a linear combination of ￿. Note that the constant term in
10We thank Tsuyoshi Nakamura for bring this information to our attention.
20￿(￿;￿) is not identi￿ed because the estimator is constructed by the di⁄erence in ￿(￿;￿). Three
speci￿cations shown in the table all imply that investment cost is regarded as approximately 10%
of the value of investment per ￿rm. For the sake of simplicity, we use Model (1) in the following
analysis; however the paper￿ s results change little when we use the other models in Table 5. The
obtained estimates of investment cost play an important role when we calculate the welfare analysis
associated with the merger.
Model Prediction To obtain a sense of how the model ￿ts the data, we compare the actual
and predicted industry prices, outputs, market shares and capital stocks over the study period.
We divide the period into two sub-periods: the pre-merger period from 1960 to 1969 and the
post-merger period after 1969. We then compare the averages and standard errors for each of the
periods. Table 6 shows the results of this comparison. The LHS of the table presents the prediction
based on the base model introduced in this section, while the RHS presents the actual data, some
variables of which were already introduced in Table 1. To save space, we list the market shares and
capital stock of the merging and non-merging parties.
The predicted values in Table 6 are calculated in the same method used in the forward simulation
when the initial state variables are the actual values of s1960. To brie￿ y review the method, using
the estimates obtained above and conditional on the current state s1960, we compute the ￿rm￿ s
current investment by use of a realized private shock randomly drawn from the estimated normal
distribution of "I
i, and Eq.(6). We then draw the realized demand and cost shocks from the
respective estimated distributions of ￿A and ui, and calculate the ￿rm￿ s marginal cost through
Eq.(2). Using the cost estimates, we subsequently solve for an equilibrium with Eqs.(4) and (11) to
obtain industry price and ￿rm outputs for the year 1960. We accumulate the calculated investment
to the respective ￿rm￿ s capital stock and use the result of the computation in the next period. We
run this forward simulation 1000 times and present the average of the simulated values for each
variable in Table 6.
The results show that the model explains the data well. Industry outputs and prices are
predicted fairly accurately, and there is no signi￿cant bias in the market share prediction. Capital
stocks appear to be underpredicted in the post-merger period from 1970 to 1979, particularly for the
merging party. Since the goodness-of-￿t measures for the demand, marginal cost, and investment
policy functions were all found to be reasonably well (discussed previously in this section), we
believe that the ￿nding of an underpredicted capital stock may well be attributed to simulation
errors. While it is di¢ cult for us to correct for this prediction bias, the results in Table 6 indicate
that our estimates of the e¢ ciency gains from the merger, which are discussed in the next section,
are likely to be understated.
215 Economic Consequence of the 1970 Merger
This section comprises two subsections and assesses the economic consequences of the horizontal
merger that took place between Yawata and Fuji in 1970. On the basis of the model and the
estimates reported in the previous section, Section 5.1 evaluates the welfare tradeo⁄ associated
with the horizontal merger by comparing the counterfactual situation, in which no merger took
place. The paper ￿nds that the merger enhanced production e¢ ciency and notably outweighed the
deadweight loss resulting from the increase in market power.
The section also assesses the e⁄ectiveness of the structural merger remedies endorsed in the
negotiation process between the J-FTC and the companies involved in the merger. The merger
was approved under the condition that the merged party would transfer its capital equipment to
two smaller companies, Kobe and Nihon Kokan. Section 5.2 performs simulation exercises to assess
the welfare consequence of this divestiture and ￿nds that the remedies reduced social welfare by
constraining investments and increasing the marginal cost of production at the industry level. We
conclude that the proposed remedies made little economic sense not only from the ex-post but also
from the ex-ante perspectives of social welfare.
5.1 Economic Impacts of Merger
This subsection intends to assess the economic impacts of the merger. To conduct the assessment,
we compare the merger outcome (as simulated in the previous section) with the no-merger outcome.
The no-merger outcome is simulated by investigating what would have happened to the steel market
had no merger taken place between Yawata and Fuji. Under this counterfactual scenario, we take
the merger as exogenous and treat Yawata and Fuji as di⁄erent business entities even in the 1970s.
Thus, we assume that Yawata and Fuji independently decided their own outputs and investments
on the basis of their own capital stocks, which continued to accumulate from the 1960s. Thus, the
number of ￿rms in the market, Nt, is assumed to be six throughout the period in the simulation
procedure performed.
Figure 4 shows the e⁄ects of the merger on the industry outcomes by year. The ￿gure contains
the following four panels: price (4-a), marginal cost (4-b), capital stock (4-c), and social surplus
(4-d). Figure 5 presents the e⁄ects for both merging and non-merging parties. The panels in the
upper row (from panels (5-a) to (5-d)) of Figure 5 indicate the merging party, and those in the
bottom row (from panels (5-e) to (5-h)) indicate the non-merging party. To conserve space, we take
the smallest integrated ￿rm, Kobe, to represent the latter group of ￿rms.11 Each row contains four
panels for the output, marginal cost, economic pro￿t, and capital stock of the ￿rm. For exhibition
11Results pertaining to the other non-merging ￿rms are available upon request.
22purposes, the upper row of Figure 5 shows the sums of Yawata and Fuji￿ s outcomes in the 1960s,
to facilitate comparison with those of Nippon Steel.
The straight line in each panel of Figures 4 and 5 indicates the ratio of the respective simulated
outcome when the merger took place to the simulated outcome in the absence of the merger. We
will discuss the implications of the dotted line in Section 5.2. A ratio higher (or lower) than
one indicates that the merger had a positive (or negative) e⁄ect on the corresponding economic
outcome. Thus, the ratio points to one in the pre-merger period of the 1960s.
The upper right panel of Figure 4 indicates that the merger did increase steel prices, but by a
small margin of 0.3% on average. Although the merging ￿rm, Nippon Steel, reduced its output from
the no-merger level (as shown in Panel (5-a)), its exercise of market power was apparently restrained
by the elastic crude demand reported in Table 3. We argued in Section 2 that an alternative source
of steel supplied by the emerging minimills may have been accountable for this ￿nding. As a result,
consumer surplus in the post-merger period decreased by a mere 0.45% ￿ or the annual equivalent
of approximately USD 300 thousand ￿ from the 1960 price.
Alternatively, the merger improved steel production e¢ ciency. Panel (4-b) illustrates that the
marginal cost at the industry level declined on average by 1.5% from the no-merger level. Nippon
Steel bene￿tted most from the merger; its e¢ ciency improved by more than 4% from the no-merger
level (see Panel (5-b)). This e¢ ciency gain comes not only from its capital accumulation but largely
from the estimated ￿rm-￿xed components, as shown in Table 4. Indeed, panel (5-d) shows that
Nippon Steel did, in fact, reduce its investment with its enlarged capital stock that resulted from
the merger. This is a consequence of the estimated policy function discussed in Figure 3.
It is interesting to note that because of the nature of strategic substitutability in the ￿rm
investment behavior, and also because of the fact that Nippon Steel decreased its investment, Kobe
gradually increased its capital investment as compared with the no-merger level (panel (5-h)).
Though the magnitude was very small, this eventually contributed to Kobe￿ s production e¢ ciency,
as shown in panel (5-f). In sum, the industry-level capital stock initially decreased but subsequently
increased, as shown in panel (4-c). The initial decrease was due to the reduction in Nippon Steel￿ s
investment, and the later increase was due to the increase in Kobe￿ s (and non-merging parties￿ )
investment.
As a consequence of this retrospective analysis, the 1970 merger was estimated to be pro￿table
not only for the merging ￿rm but also for the non-merging ￿rms, and was, therefore, welfare-
improving (see panel (4-d)). Nippon Steel saw its pro￿ts increase by more than 60% on average (see
panel (5-c)), while the non-merging ￿rms (or Kobe) by 24% (or 31%) (see panel (5-g)). However,
the ￿rms￿bene￿ts from the merger gradually subsided with the depreciation of capital.
235.2 E⁄ectiveness of Merger Remedies
A considerable and increasing proportion of the mergers reviewed recently are approved after reme-
dies have been o⁄ered, such as divestitures, provision of access or conduct commitments (see Lev-
eque and Shelanski, 2004, for U.S. and EU experiences). Though remedies are an important tool
and an opportunity for competition authorities to ￿x the competition problems generated by a
merger, few studies empirically assess the e⁄ectiveness of merger remedies. This section performs
such an analysis using the example taken from the 1970 steel merger.
The merger was approved under the condition that Yawata and Fuji would transfer 1.5% of
their production facilities to Kobe and 0.3% to Nihon Kokan. This subsection uses a simulation
method similar to the one used in the previous section and investigates what would have happened
to the market and integrated steel makers had the merger been approved with no such remedies.
An answer to this question also provides us with an assessment of whether and how divestiture
e⁄ectively improved economic welfare.
The dotted line in Figures 4 and 5 displays the ratio of the simulated equilibrium outcome
under the counterfactual situation where Yawata and Fuji merged in the absence of the remedies
to the corresponding outcome without the merger. Hence, the di⁄erence between the straight and
dotted lines indicates the e⁄ectiveness of the divestiture remedies under study. Two interesting
￿ndings emerged from the ￿gures. First, steel prices would have risen owning to the imposition
of the remedies. Second, production e¢ ciency would have deteriorated by 0.3% with the merger
remedies relative to the no-remedies level.
The remedies did appear to help the ￿rms who received the assets from Nippon Steel. As
indicated in panel (5-f), Kobe improved its marginal cost annually by 0.19%, because it obtained
the divested asset. However, this asset transfer raised the industry-level marginal cost (see panel
(4-b)) because Nippon Steel would have made much better use of such assets than did Nihon Kokan
or Kobe (as shown in panel (5-b)). As a result, the remedies reduced industry output and therefore
increased steel prices (but only by approximately JPY 40 per ton).
According to the estimated investment policy function depicted in Figure 3, the remedies would
have provided Nippon Steel with con￿ icting incentives regarding its investment decision. On the
one hand, the asset transfer would have encouraged the ￿rm to invest more (see the upper-right
panel of Figure 3); on the other hand, active investment conducted by non-merging ￿rms including
Kobe would have discouraged Nippon Steel from investing in capital. In our estimation, the latter
e⁄ect is found to be larger (as shown in panel (5-d)), so that the marginal cost of production
would not have decreased more than that without the remedies (see panels (4-b) and (5-b)). Since
the decline in the merging party￿ s pro￿t was more than the bene￿t received by the non-merging
party (see panels (5-c) and (5-g)), social welfare would have decreased on average by 7.2% with the
24proposed remedies (see panel (4-d)). To conclude our ex-post analysis of the merger remedies, we
found that while they succeeded in keeping the competitors viable, the merger remedies failed to
maximize economic social welfare.
Note that in many industrial countries, merger reviews are required before a merger actually
takes place. It is thus an interesting research question to examine merger remedies in terms of an
ex-ante perspective based on the information available before the merger event. We attempt to
answer this question by using the structural estimates obtained in Section 4 and the data available
up to the year of 1969. The three items shown in Table 7 are su¢ cient for this analysis: elasticity
of ￿rm investment with respect to the ￿rm￿ s capital, investment elasticity with respect to the other
￿rms￿capital, and elasticity of marginal cost with respect to the ￿rm￿ s capital stock. The ￿rst two
elasticities are obtained from Figure 4 and the last is obtained from Table 4: all are conditional
upon the 1969 data. Table 7 indicates that transferring productive assets from the merging ￿rms to
Nihon Kokan and Kobe appeared to make little economic sense. Yawata and Fuji would have made
more investments in the absence of the remedies. Indeed, Kobe would have invested more if the
merging party had not transferred its assets as stipulated in the remedy proposal. Furthermore, the
marginal cost estimates show that Yawata and Fuji produced steel as e¢ cient as either Nihon Kokan
or Kobe in 1969. Therefore, it appears from this ￿nal analysis that J-FTC would have exercised
better judgment in terms of improving economic social welfare had it endorsed the proposed merger
without the remedies.
6 Conclusion
This paper estimated a dynamic oligopoly model to evaluate the economic consequences of the
horizontal merger that took place in 1970 between Yawata and Fuji. This merger created Nippon
Steel, which has since remained the second largest steel producer in the world, after U.S. Steel at
the time of the merger and now after Arcelor Mittal. In order to conduct policy experiments, it was
necessary to determine all the parameters of the model, including the demand and cost functions,
investment policy function, and distribution of exogenous shocks. Characterizing the relationship
between the data generating process and the equilibrium played in the model was complicated by
the fact that the model involved repeated interactions. We solved for an MPNE of the model by
using the method proposed by Ericson and Pakes (1995) and Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007).
Three important observations emerged from our estimation results. First, the obtained esti-
mates implied that steel demand was fairly elastic with respect to price. This ￿nding indicated
that the price hike observed in the data were primarily due to shifts in demand; the merger would
have left little room for the merged ￿rm to exercise its market power. Second, the marginal cost
estimates indicated that scale economies existed in capacity size. They also showed the existence
25of cost synergies associated with the merger (as implied by the ￿rm-￿xed e⁄ects). These results
appeared to ensure that the merger entailed production e¢ ciency. Finally, the estimates obtained
from the policy function pointed out changes in the nature of strategic interaction in investment
behavior among ￿rms. The ￿rms￿ capital investments strategically complemented one another
prior to the 1970 merger. Once the merger took place, however, the investments altered to become
strategic substitutes, implying that a ￿rm responds by investing more when others invest less. We
conjectured in the paper that the change in the nature of strategic interaction in investment behav-
ior might have been accounted for by the fact that the Japanese steel industry entered a mature
phase of its evolution.
On the basis of the obtained estimates, we ￿rst assessed the economic impacts of the horizontal
merger in 1970. The simulation exercises indicated that the merger improved production e¢ ciency
not only for the merged party but also for the non-merged party, and thus enhanced economic social
welfare. The non-merging party increased its e¢ ciency because Nippon Steel reduced its investment
in its capacity from the counterfactual no-merger level. The feature of strategic substitutability
in investment would have made the non-merging ￿rms respond by investing more in their own
capacities. Under the restrained market power, the merger would have enhanced social welfare by
an annual average of more than 40%, or equivalently USD 250 million.
Next, we evaluated the merger remedies of divestiture endorsed by the competition authority in
the 1970 merger. The divestiture remedies stipulated that the merged party would transfer 1.8% of
its production facility to two smaller competitors. The simulation results showed that while they
helped the smaller ￿rms remain viable competitors in the market, the proposed divestiture remedies
failed to achieve the full e¢ ciencies that should have been realized from the merger. Indeed, we
found that the remedies would have undermined the industry-level production e¢ ciency by half a
percent, indicating that the remedies would have hurt social welfare by an annual amount of JPY
21 billion, or USD 70 million.
We also reported that the result of a welfare-improving merger based on the above retrospective
analysis holds even in the ex-ante perspective, when we consider the remedies on the basis of
the information available prior to the merger. Indeed, it appeared to make little economic sense
for J-FTC to endorse the proposed remedies under the situation where the ￿rms￿ investments
complemented each other strategically and thus increased with capacity size; production e¢ ciency
would have surely improved in the absence of the divestiture.
In this paper, we have shown that both the static and dynamic analyses agreed that the merger
under study was welfare improving. Applying data pertaining to the Japanese steel industry in
the 1960s and 1970s, our dynamic estimation model has provided us with additional useful insights
regarding merger reviews, which are often required before a merger actually takes place. To assess
26the proposed remedies, this paper has suggested that the competition authority gain better knowl-
edge of the structures of the marginal cost and investment policy functions of the ￿rms involved in
the merger under investigation. These estimates, along with demand estimates, are available from
the static estimation framework, and may help us easily evaluate the welfare consequence of the
remedies, as we did in this paper.
A Data Appendix
Annual data on the industry- and ￿rm-level output data were obtained from Japan Iron and Steel
Federation (1960-1980). The annual price data for domestically produced crude steel were taken
directly from companies￿semiannual ￿nancial reports (1960-1980). We found that the price level
did not vary widely across ￿rms, and hence, Yawata￿ s crude steel prices in the 1960s and Nippon
Steel￿ s prices in the 1970s were used for the estimation. This price was adjusted by the manufactured
goods WPI to a constant 1960 Japanese yen.
Two input prices were used in the paper: data on iron ore and heavy oil were taken from the
Bank of Japan (1960-1980). Data on the average seaborne shipping distance of iron ore, the variable
that is used as an instrument for the demand estimation, were obtained came from Japan Iron and
Steel Federation (1960-1980).
Our measure of ￿rm-level capital stock is the ￿rm-level physical ￿xed production asset, taken
from companies￿semiannual ￿nancial reports (1960-1980). From the data on capital stock, we
constructed the annual amount of ￿rm-level investment. Both capital stock and investment data
were converted from book value to market value by following the method proposed in Ogawa and
Kitasaka (1998). We used the national wealth survey of 1960 to obtain the average age of each
physical asset in the Japanese steel industry. The annual depreciation rate of 0.0805 was used, the
value of which was estimated by Ogawa and Kitasaka (1998). Finally, investment and capital stock
were adjusted by the manufactured goods WPI to a constant 1960 Japanese yen.
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Price Average 42991 62972
(in JPY per ton) (2983) (16744)
Output Average 34.15 80.56
(in Million tons) (16.80) (7.69)
Annual Growth Rate (%) 18.16 2.15
Capital Investment Merging Party
(in 100 billion JPY) Average 0.99 1.46
(0.67) (0.78)




Share (%) 13.70 17.37
Capital Stock Merging Party
(in 100 billion JPY) Average 4.40 12.27
(1.49) (1.82)




Share (%) 12.28 15.10
Notes:
Standard Error of the estimate is shown inside parenthesis. 
Price, capital investment and stock are in terms of 1960 price. 
The merging party is the sum of Yawata and Fuji in the 1960s, and Nippon Steel in the 1970s.
Values in non-merging firm in the table is the firm average of Nihon Kokan, Kawasaki, 
Sumitomo, and Kobe.
TABLE 1
Summary Statistics for Important Variables
Japanese Steel from 1960 to 1979%%
Yawata 0.25 Nippon Steel 0.45
Fuji 0.23
Nihon Kokan 0.18 Nihon Kokan 0.19
Kawasaki 0.16 Kawasaki 0.16
Sumitomo 0.14 Sumitomo 0.14
Kobe 0.04 Kobe 0.06
HHI 1946 2874
Steel Production 62.549 Steel Production 62.398
For the six firms For the five firms
(Million ton) (Million ton)
TABLE 2
Market Shares of Steel Production:
Impact of the 1970 Merger





(5.082) (1.979) (0.546) (2.349)
Quantity squared 1.86 1.26
(1.877) (2.287)



















(0.200) (0.432) (0.613) (0.212) (0.499) (0.635)
Number of observations 20 20 20 20 20 20
Adjusted R-squared 0.951 0.951 0.952 0.947 0.947 0.951




log-likelihood -187.78 -187.05 32.17 -188.39 -187.72 31.92
Elasticity w.r.t price 3.41 3.76 4.31 2.96 3.06 3.95
Notes:
Subscripts a and b indicate significance at the 99- and 95-confidence levels.
Standard Error of the estimate is shown inside parenthesis. Demand function is specified in Eq. (11) in the text. The year dummy variables are
included for the period after the first oil crisis of 1973, the estimates of which are not reported in the table. For presentation purpose, the 
variables of Quantity and Quantity squared are divided by 1.0e+04, 1.0e+12, respectively. The variable of Government expenditure for the 
log-linear specification is divided by 1.0e+05, and intercepts for the linear and quadratic specifications are multiplied by 1.0e+04. The 
instruments used for Quantity and Quantity squared in 2SLS are prices of iron ore and heavy oil (both in logarithms) and the average seaborne 




TABLE 3( 4-A ) ( 4-B ) ( 4-C ) ( 4-D )
capital stock -538.15 
b -1407.66 
a -360.47 -516.76 
b














(1.01) (0.83) (0.97) (1.01)
Firm-specific component: Fixed Random Fixed Fixed
Nippon -1878.05 - -2498.24 -2409.20
Fuji -356.63 - -64.21 -52.31
Yawata -742.04 - -553.37 -455.95
Nihon Kokan 141.41 - 470.27 464.79
Kawasaki 252.16 - 628.52 604.31
Sumitomo 297.41 - 702.08 667.44
Kobe 797.38 - 1314.95 1180.93
Number of Observations 110 110 103 103
Wu-Hauseman test - 60.37 
a --
heteroskedastic residual No No No Yes
Breusch-Pagan tests 3.38 0.97 1.05 -
AR(1) coefficient - - 0.508 0.508
Elasticity w.r.t capital stock -0.024 -0.053 -0.014 -0.018
Notes:
Subscripts a, b, and c indicate significance at the 99-, 95-, and 90-confidence levels.
Standard Error of the estimate is shown inside parenthesis. 
All specifications include year-specific effects. Wu-Hausman test rejects the random effect specification
 (3-B). Breusch-Pagan tests would not reject the presence of heteroskedasticity. The AR(1) coefficients
 are estimated, which are assumed to be common across firms. Elasticity w.r.t capital stock is the 



















No. Obs 300 300 300
Notes:
Subscript a indicates significance at the 99-percent significance level. 
Standard Error of the estimate is shown inside parenthesis. 
TABLE 5
Investment-cost EstimatesPre-Merger Post-Merger Pre-Merger Post-Merger
1960-69 1970-79 1960-69 1970-79
Industry Output  35.2 80.8 34.2 80.6
(in M ton) (15.3) (16.9) (16.8) (7.7)
Price 43007 63354 42991 62972
 (in JPY per ton) (2986) (16910) (2983) (16744)
Merging Party
Market share 48.5 38.7 48.9 42.3
(%) (0.8) (4.9) (3.8) (1.7)
Capital stock 4.1 8.8 4.4 12.3
 (in 100 B JPY) (1.4) (0.6) (1.5) (1.8)
Non-Merging Party
Market share 51.5 61.3 51.1 57.7
(%) (0.8) (4.9) (3.8) (1.7)
Capital stock 4.6 16.0 4.4 19.3
 (in 100 B JPY) (2.2) (3.5) (2.0) (5.3)
Notes:
Standard Error of the estimate is shown inside parenthesis. 
Merging party are the sum of Yawata and Fuji in the 1960s, and Nippon Steel
 in the 1970s. Non-merging party are the sum of Nihon Kokan, Kawasaki,
Sumitomo, and Kobe. JPY is in terms of 1960 price. 
TABLE 6
Model Prediction
Prediction ActualElasticities of mci, 1969 w.r.t.
ki, 1969 Σkj, 1969 ki, 1969
Yawata 1.332 0.233 -0.018
Fuji 1.135 0.525 -0.018
Nihon Kokan  1.092 0.565 -0.018
Kawasaki 0.986 0.654 -0.017
Sumitomo 0.852 0.755 -0.016
Kobe 0.396 1.043 -0.009
Notes:
Elasticities of Ii, 1969 are obtained from the estimates from the investment policy
function (as shown in Figures 2 and 3 ), while elasticities of mci, 1969 are from
Table 4. The company names are in order of market share in 1969.
Nihon Kokan and Kobe, indicated in bold, received capital equipment from 
Yawata and Fuji, also indicated bold.
Elasticities of Ii, 1969 w.r.t
TABLE 7
Ex-ante examination of Merger Remedies
Estimated Elasticities from 1969Note: Discontinuities in 1978 are due to changes in measurement unit reported in Japan Iron and Steel Federation (1960-1980).
FIGURE 1
Evolution of Capacity Sizes:














Blast FurnacesEstimated Investment Policy Function
FIGURE 2


































(in 1960 price)FIGURE 3
Estimated Investment Policy Function


















































































































































































































































































































































































































Σj≠i  kj Σj≠i  kjNotes:
The straight line in each figure is the ratio of corresponding economic outcome under the merger relative to that in the absence of merger. 
The dotted line is the ratio of corresponding economic merger outcome without the remedies to the outcome in the absence of merger.
FIGURE 4
Impacts of Merger (straight line) and Merger Remedies (dotted line) on Industry Outcomes:


























































1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978
Merger
Merger w/o
remediesMerging Party (Yawata and Fuji, and Nippon Steel)
Kobe (as representing the non-merging firms)
Notes:
The straight line in each figure is the ratio of corresponding economic outcome under the merger relative to that in the absence of merger. 
The dotted line is the ratio of corresponding economic merger outcome without the remedies to the outcome in the absence of merger.
FIGURE 5
Impacts of Merger (straight line) and Merger Remedies (dotted line) on Economic Outcomes for Selected Firms
Comparison with the absence of Merger
(5-a)













































































































1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978
Merger
Merger w/o
remedies